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Abstract MacIntyre argues that management embodies
emotivism, and thus is inherently amoral and manipulative.
His claim that management is necessarily Weberian is, at
best, outdated, and the notion that management aims to be
neutral and value free is incorrect. However, new forms of
management, and in particular the increased emphasis on
leadership which emerged after MacIntyre’s critique was
published, tend to support his central charge. Indeed,
charismatic and transformational forms of leadership seem
to embody emotivism to a greater degree than do more
Weberian, bureaucratic forms of management; hence,
MacIntyre’s central contention about our emotivistic cul-
ture seems to be well founded. Having criticised the details
but defended the essence of MacIntyre’s critique of man-
agement, this paper sketches a MacIntyrean approach to
management and leadership by highlighting the affinities
between MacIntyre’s political philosophy and Greenleaf’s
concept of servant leadership.
Keywords Management history  Emotivism  Alasdair
MacIntyre  Virtue ethics  Charismatic leadership  Servant
leadership
Introduction
MacIntyre has been cited in the business ethics literature
more frequently than any other living virtue ethicist (Fer-
rero and Sison 2014). Most of the business ethics schol-
arship informed by MacIntyre has focused on his ‘goods-
practices-institutions’ framework as it relates to business
ethics, but this paper focuses instead on his other contri-
bution to business ethics—his critique of management.
Numerous scholars have sought to challenge this critique
(for example, Brewer 1997; Dobson 2009; Hartman 2015,
et cetera). However, this paper aims to show that MacIn-
tyre’s charge that management is emotivistic is worthy of
reconsideration and argues that although MacIntyre’s cri-
tique of management, advanced in his magnum opus After
Virtue (2007 [1981]), faces a number of compelling
objections, his central contention that management,
broadly defined, is emotivistic is plausible. Furthermore, it
goes on to suggest that this is more readily evident in the
forms of management and, especially, leadership that have
emerged since After Virtue was published than it was in the
preceding period. Existing work on MacIntyre’s relevance
to business ethics has paid little attention to the history of
management thought, and this paper aims to remedy that
oversight.
The first section outlines MacIntyre’s critique of man-
agement. MacIntyre argues that management embodies
emotivism, and thus is inherently amoral and represents an
‘‘obliteration of the distinction between manipulative and
non-manipulative’’ relation (2007, p. 30). The second
section outlines and endorses two related objections to
MacIntyre’s account, namely that MacIntyre is wrong
about the place of management in our culture, and wrong to
suppose that management is inherently amoral. Indeed, a
number of scholars sympathetic to and influenced by
MacIntyre’s ethical theory have argued for the possibility
of ethical management (Beabout 2012, 2013; Beadle 2013;
Dawson and Bartholomew 2003; Moore 2008, 2012, 2015,
amongst others). Another component of the case against
MacIntyre is the emergence of the ‘cultural turn’ in man-
agement thinking that occurred in the 1980s, which meant
& Matthew Sinnicks
matthewsinnicks@yahoo.co.uk
1 Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
123
J Bus Ethics (2018) 147:735–746
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3381-6
that management thinking moved definitively beyond
MacIntyre’s characterisation of it as essentially Weberian.
The third section argues that the new forms of manage-
ment, and in particular the renewed emphasis on leader-
ship, especially the dominant forms—charismatic and
transformational leadership—that grew out of this cultural
turn embody emotivism to a greater degree than Weberian
bureaucratic management could have done, and therefore
MacIntyre’s critique remains pertinent. MacIntyre’s cri-
tique targets those who possess power and authority within
organisations, and so while he focused on managers, it
applies to leaders too. While these notions are interde-
pendent and inextricably linked, there is a conceptual dis-
tinction to be made between them on the grounds that
management is more closely associated with technical
expertise and careful planning, and leadership is often
regarded as being akin to an art form (see March and Weil
2005).
While the main aim of this paper is to support a com-
ponent of one of MacIntyre’s more destructive theses, the
fourth section adopts a more constructive aim: that of
outlining the shape of a MacIntyrean account of leadership.
This section outlines the affinities between MacIntyre’s
political philosophy and Greenleaf’s concept of servant
leadership. Greenleaf’s concept offers both a promising
alternative to emotivistic forms of leadership and man-
agement, as well as a position which captures some of the
key features of MacIntyre’s work which have rarely been
the focus of attention within business ethics.
MacIntyre’s Critique of the Manager
Emotivism is the doctrine that moral assertions are, in
essence, statements of preference. Accordingly, emotivism
is sometimes known as the ‘boo/hurrah’ theory of morality.
That is, to say ‘x is good’ is to say something like ‘hurrah
for x’ or ‘I approve of x, do so as well’. While this doctrine
has roots that extend back at least as far as Hume, its
modern incarnation can be dated to early twentieth century
moral philosophers Ayer and Stevenson, who had been
inspired by Moore’s argument against ethical naturalism in
his Principia Ethica (1903). Moore had argued that good-
ness is a simple, non-natural property that can be grasped by
intuition alone. Ayer and Stevenson accepted this emphasis
on intuition over reason, and the claim that goodness cannot
be equated with something’s being desirable, pleasurable,
or conducive to flourishing. However, they further argued
that when we make moral statements, we are not describing
some factual state of affairs, but are rather simply
expressing our emotions. As Stevenson puts it:
The emotive meaning of a word is a tendency of a
word, arising through the history of its usage, to
produce… affective responses in people. It is the
immediate aura of feeling which hovers about a
word… Roughly, then, the sentence ‘X is good’
means We like X (1944, pp. 23–24).
This entails that moral argument cannot be an attempt at
rational persuasion. If our moral statements are nothing
other than statements of subjective preference, then any
genuine attempt at rational persuasion will be incoherent.
For MacIntyre, emotivism ‘‘entails the obliteration of any
genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipu-
lative social relations…others are always means, never ends’’
(2007, pp. 23–24). When we say ‘X is good’, meaning ‘We
like X’, we may hope that assent from our audience is
forthcoming; we may even hope that our statement causes
that assent, but we are not offering a justification of the view
that X is, in fact, good. However, this is not merely an
innocent error restricted to academic discussions of ethics,
thinks MacIntyre. Instead, while the emotivists failed to
adequately account for the meaning of moral statements per
se, ‘murder is wrong’ simply does not mean ‘I dislike mur-
der’, they did successfully describe a key feature of our
culture, i.e. the acceptance that there is no moral truth, and
that moral claims merely reflect subjective preference.
Indeed, according to MacIntyre, we live in a distinctly
emotivistic culture. This is demonstrated by the prevalence
of the characters that dominate the drama of contemporary
social life and shape the avenues available to agents within
our society. While the Victorian age was dominated by
characters such as the public school headmaster, the
explorer, and the engineer, the present age is to be under-
stood with reference to the therapist, the rich aesthete, and,
most importantly for the purposes of the present paper, the
manager. Characters, in MacIntyre’s sense, ‘‘are social
roles of a particular type because not only do they involve
definitions of obligation and relationship (as do all social
roles) but they also bear particular moral ideals and become
representative of their social order through so doing’’
(Beadle 2002, p. 46); they are ‘‘those social roles which
provide a culture with its moral definitions’’ (MacIntyre
2007, p. 31). Of the characters MacIntyre discusses, the
manager, ‘‘that dominant figure on the contemporary
scene’’ (2007, p. 74), receives the most extensive treatment:
the manager represents in his character the oblitera-
tion of the distinction between manipulative and non-
manipulative social relations … The manager treats
ends as given, as outside his scope; his concern is
with technique, with effectiveness in transforming
raw materials into final products, unskilled labor into
skilled labor, investment into profits. (2007, p. 30)
For MacIntyre, the manager is manipulative, incapable of
entering into a genuine moral argument, and matches
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means to given ends without assessing those ends. This
inability to assess ends is not a matter of individual
failing, but is instead a definitive feature of the managerial
role.
[Managers] are seen by themselves, and by those who
see them with the same eyes as their own, as
uncontested figures, who purport to restrict them-
selves to the realms in which rational agreement is
possible – that is, of course from their point of view
to the realm of fact, the realm of means, the realm of
measurable effectiveness. (ibid)
It is this separation of means from ends which, so
MacIntyre argues, gives management its distinctively
Weberian nature. According to Weber, the bureaucracies
dominant in modern societies have become ‘‘increasingly
more precise in calculating the methodical attainment of
given practical ends’’ and so practical rationality is simply
the ‘‘methodical attainment of a particular given practical
end through the increasingly precise calculation of ade-
quate means’’ (1967, p. 293). From a Weberian perspec-
tive, ends are not set by rationality, only means are, and
managers—bureaucratic experts—are capable of devising
these means. According to MacIntyre ‘‘Weber’s thought
embodies just those dichotomies which emotivism embod-
ies, and obliterates just those distinctions to which
emotivism has to be blind’’ (MacIntyre 2007, p. 26).
Indeed, the Weberian view is committed to holding that
‘‘Questions of ends are questions of values, and on values
reason is silent; conflict between rival values cannot be
settled’’ (ibid). Weberian bureaucratic rationality is there-
fore unable to distinguish between manipulative and non-
manipulative social relations and unable, that is, to
distinguish between merely causing agreement and rational
persuasion, thereby rendering management an embodiment
of emotivism.
Weberian management understands and presents itself
as being a neutral, value-free, scientific expertise becoming
ever more precise in its execution of its pre-ordained ends.
As such, it aims to be regarded as a tool which can be used
to exercise control over the bureaucracies in which it is
employed. However, a final noteworthy aspect of MacIn-
tyre’s critique of management is his claim that pursuit of
bureaucratic expertise is rendered yet more problematic by
the fact that the kind of social scientific expertise upon
which it seems to rely is impossible. Both in the decades
from which MacIntyre draws his examples and the present
day, the predictions issued by those social scientists who
aim to posit law-like generalisations are notoriously faulty.
Any managerial claims to such scientific expertise are
therefore spurious.
However, MacIntyre makes a more substantial point
about the ineliminability of fortuna from social life, and
claims that any attempt to discover law-like generalisations
in the social sciences is doomed to failure:
given the best possible stock of generalizations, we
may on the day be defeated by an unpredicted and
unpredictable counter-example – and yet still see no
way to improve our generalizations and still have no
reason to abandon them or even reformulate them.
(2007, p. 93)
MacIntyre’s examples of failed predictions include the fact
that economic forecasts using the most advanced methods
were less successful than predictions based on assuming
that the next six months will resemble the last and that
growth is best forecast by taking the average over the last
ten years (2007, p. 89). Moreover, the general point that
‘‘Nonexperimental social science currently is not capable
of making useful, reliable, and nonobvious predictions for
the effects of most proposed policy interventions’’ (Manzi
2012, p. 16) has, by now, been made many times. Yet,
according to MacIntyre, such law-like generalisations
would be necessary for managerial power and authority
to be justified.
While MacIntyre is probably correct about the inherent
limitations of social science, the notion that knowledge of
law-like generalisations is a prerequisite of managerial
effectiveness is more contentious. Indeed, there is much
else in his account that is contentious, and so it is to
objections facing MacIntyre’s characterisation of manage-
ment we now turn.
Objections to MacIntyre’s Account
At the end of chapter 8 of After Virtue, MacIntyre concedes
that managers and bureaucrats will likely reply to his
criticisms that they are as sceptical as he is about the
possibility of law-like generalisations in the social sciences
but that nevertheless they are entitled to be acknowledged
as experts for the more modest competences they do pos-
sess. MacIntyre’s response is to acknowledge that this may
be the case but to argue that ‘‘claims of this modest kind
could never legitimate the possession or uses of power
either within or by bureaucratic corporations on anything
like the scale on which that power is wielded’’ (2007,
p. 108). That it can be plausibly claimed that some cor-
porations have greater power than nation states, and even
that corporations now control society (Beck 2000, p. 32),
provides some support for MacIntyre’s contention. How-
ever, as we will see in our discussion of the emergence of
leadership as an alternative to traditional forms of man-
agement, the claim to social scientific expertise is now
often explicitly eschewed by those who hold positions of
power within organisations. If this is so, then bureaucratic
corporations do not depend on the possibility of knowledge
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of law-like generalisations in the social sciences. Before we
turn our attention to leadership, however, we will consider
two related objections to MacIntyre’s position: that man-
agement is not regarded as an exemplar of expertise within
our culture, and that management is not inherently amoral.
Large-scale bureaucratic organisations loom large over
the skyline of modernity, and so those in charge of such
organisations are necessarily of sociological and cultural
importance. However, the evidence does not support
MacIntyre’s contentions about the place of the manager
within our culture. McMylor suggests that MacIntyre’s
argument aims to be ‘culturalist’ rather than empirical
(2015, p. 101). However, there is no sharp dichotomy
between empirical and culturalist arguments: any cultur-
alist argument will be answerable to empirical evidence
pertaining to the culture in question, and it seems clear that
we do not inhabit a culture that is in thrall to management.
While managers may have been held in higher esteem in
the decades preceding the publication of After Virtue,
consider how management is typically portrayed within
contemporary culture. From The Office and Dilbert, to
films such as Office Space, Horrible Bosses, and 9 to 5, to
give just a few examples, management is frequently pre-
sented in popular media as incompetent, or malicious, or
both. As Hendry notes, ‘‘in the popular British press the
terms ‘CEO’ and ‘fat cat’ have become virtually synony-
mous’’ (2004, p. 185). Part of the appeal of these portrayals
is their familiarity—they ring true to audiences. The
managerial characters who inspire laughter, or embarrass-
ment, or anger, are not presented as aberrations, but rather
as being common within contemporary organisations. Such
popular portrayals of management in the media and arts,
although clearly not the final word on the matter, do not
suggest managers are perceived as being technical experts,
rationally matching means to ends with unerring efficiency.
Indeed, such portrayals do not even present managers as
unsuccessfully attempting to embody neutral and value-
free knowledge, which would probably be regarded as an
improvement on the way in which management is in fact
depicted. Business schools have not, as a matter of fact, led
to management being regarded as a profession in the same
way as medicine and law. While some may think this
lamentable (as does Khurana 2007, for instance), and
indeed calls for the professionalisation of management may
be a sign that a more holistic and sophisticated conception
of management is advancing, this development neverthe-
less suggests that MacIntyre’s argument about the place of
management in our culture is open to question.
Let us now turn to the second objection, the claim that
management is not amoral. MacIntyre’s argument is that
the managerial role forces individuals to compartmentalise
their judgements relative to the roles they happen to occupy
and so reach very different conclusions about moral issues
when acting in accordance with different roles, and thus are
unable to exercise genuine moral agency (see MacIntyre
2006 for more on compartmentalisation and social roles).
Again, the empirical evidence does not seem to support this
argument, at least not uniformly (even if MacIntyre’s case
against high finance is more compelling—see MacIntyre
2015). In support of MacIntyre’s argument, McMylor
claims that ‘‘the recurring theme of managerial ideologies
[is] the offer of pure technique, neutral and value free’’
(1993, p. 143). However, there is much in the literature that
suggests management, rather than being a matter of mere
technical expertise, is a complex mixture of skills and
abilities (see, for example, Bowie and Werhane 2005). As
such, management does not aim to be value free. Carroll
(2001) suggests that most managers are amoral, some are
immoral, and some are moral. Even if this is so, we can still
conclude that management in itself is not inherently
amoral, contrary to what MacIntyre’s argument suggests.
Furthermore, business ethics and business ethics edu-
cation are, and will continue to be, regarded as being
deeply important. Evans and Weiss (2008) found that over
80% of CEOs, deans and business school faculty surveyed
agree that more emphasis should be placed on ethics edu-
cation in business schools. The dissatisfaction is not only
felt by academic staff, however. Ditlev-Simonsen and
Midttun (2011) surveyed approximately 200 students and
found that they felt that managers were insufficiently
motivated by ethical concerns when reasoning about cor-
porate morality. Such surveys may highlight that man-
agement is ethically lacking, and perhaps too often prey to
a tendency to prioritise bureaucratic efficiency. Further-
more, we may wonder whether respondents are simply
being guided by contemporary cultural depictions of
management of the kind described above. Nevertheless, the
mere fact that business school staff and students feel it
appropriate to address the question of managerial ethics
suggests that Weber’s conception of management is not
dominant.
Some of the literature on management has been
expressly critical of MacIntyre’s argument. For example,
Dobson has sought to challenge MacIntyre’s position and
has plausibly argued that ‘‘many managers do in fact
devote non-superficial moral reflection to their role as
managers’’ (2009, p. 46). Whatever the pressures placed on
agents by managerial roles, it is hard to believe that such
pressures rule out such moral reflection entirely. However,
we might still wonder whether reflection is likely to be
useful if the role in question demands an exploitative
attitude towards subordinates.
As I noted above, a number of scholars sympathetic to
MacIntyre’s work have also defended the possibility of
ethical management in MacIntyrean terms. In particular,
Moore has sought to develop an account of managerial
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ethics based on MacIntyre’s work. While Moore claims
that it ‘‘seems clear that the basic tenets of [MacIntyre’s]
position, at least in respect of managers in business
organisations under Anglo-American capitalism, remain in
place’’ (2008, p. 495), he ultimately concludes that the
claim that management is amoral is incorrect: ‘‘Are man-
agers simply the morally-neutral efficient achievers of
predetermined ends? Clearly… the answer is no’’ (ibid,
p. 505).
If management is concerned with ethics, then it is not
genuinely Weberian. At the very least, MacIntyre has
exaggerated the tendency towards bureaucratic rationality
within managerial thought. However, even if we have
reason to remain sceptical about the ethical claims of some
defenders of management, there is still much to suggest
that MacIntyre’s critique of management is incorrect.
The reality of fortuna, which makes knowledge of law-
like generalisations impossible in the social realm, means
that on a macro-level, the kind of expertise MacIntyre
argues is required to justify managerial authority is
unavailable, but it also has micro-level ramifications for
managers. Because of the unpredictability of the realm in
which they operate, managers can easily become embroiled
in complex office politics far removed from what we would
expect of genuinely Weberian bureaucrats. According to
Jackall’s rich study of the world of corporate life, managers
spend much of their time selling themselves and partici-
pating in ‘‘ongoing struggles for dominance and status’’
(2010, p. 208). Jackall also speaks of ‘‘continuous uncer-
tainty and… masked conflict’’ (2010, p. 37) as telling
features of managerial work. This portrayal may not be
flattering, and certainly does nothing to advance the ethical
credentials of management, but it is hard to square with
MacIntyre’s account which holds management to be
essentially Weberian.
In light of these objections, it seems that MacIntyre’s
characterisation of the manager at times lapses into cari-
cature, and therefore there are parts of his critique of
management that we must simply give up. However, this is
not to say that the charge of emotivism fails: managers,
especially those in leadership roles, remain open to the
broader charge of emotivism characteristic of management.
Leadership and Emotivism
Throughout the decades preceding the publication of After
Virtue, management went through a stage we might call
‘high Weberianism’. During this period, management was
widely, although not universally, understood in quasi-sci-
entific terms and regarded as being principally concerned
with impersonal technique, while softer notions such as
values and culture were marginalised. According to
Khurana:
When salaried managers first appeared in the large
corporations of the late nineteenth century, then
began to proliferate, it was not obvious who they
were, what they did, or why they should be entrusted
with the task of running corporations. (2007, p. 3)
However, as bureaucratic management came to be
accepted as normal and legitimate, the notion that
managers require a kind of expertise, at least akin to that
of other professionals such as medical doctors and lawyers,
seems to have come to be tacitly accepted by the most
influential business educational institutions. This is evident
in Harold James’ description of the history of business
schools:
[A]s they developed in the course of the twentieth
century, graduate business schools aimed at profes-
sionalising management. Especially in the United
States, they were designed to give modern managers
a new status that would be commensurable with a
changed and enhanced role in an evolving and
improving economy. The new institutions were
sharply distinguished from the older commercial
schools which emphasized practical and vocational
training. Their founders wanted a higher prestige and
a more abstract and academic education for managers
who would form an elite. (2009, p. 16)
However, in this quest for professional status, business
schools went beyond the standards of law schools, for
instance, and sought to use quantitative social scientific
methods in order to attain a veneer of academic respectabil-
ity. This aim led to a technicist conception of management
that resulted in what Donaldson has referred to as a
‘‘technical, scientifically inspired regimen’’ (1994, p. 4). As
Freeman and Newkirk put it: ‘‘Implicit in much of the
management discussion is a mechanical, deterministic,
positivistic view of business—a financial engine controlled
by the machinery of scientific management’’ (2009, p. 117),
a view that has been criticised for its inherent ‘physics envy’
(Ghoshal 2005). Such a mechanistic picture of the world
informs that great statement of managerial expertise,
Taylor’s The Principles of Scientific Management.
Despite the dominance of this mechanistic view, there
was a flirtation with the notion of moulding values
described in Mayo’s work in the 1930s, and the subsequent
‘Human Relations’ movement. This movement, despite its
emphasis on values, ‘‘continued to be framed by the notion
that the leadership of business management… offered the
best hope for employee welfare’’ (Grant and Mills 2006,
p. 216). Furthermore, according to Johnson and Duberley:
[T]he Human Relations Movement … embraced the
idea that management could become the manipulators
of social harmony in the workplace without making
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significant changes to extant bureaucratic infrastruc-
tures. (2010, p. 573)
As such, while the existence of this movement provides
evidence against the claim that management is entirely
unconcerned with questions of values, and so is not
compatible with MacIntyre’s account of management as
being essentially Weberian, it does highlight the manipu-
lative ends to which ‘managerial values’ can be put, and so
is compatible with the broader charge of emotivism, a topic
we will return to below. In any case, this value-laden
approach was soon superseded by a more thoroughly
bureaucratic one.
According to Witzel’s study of the history of manage-
ment thought, ‘‘Where there is judgement there is doubt,
and one of the purposes of the new scientific approach to
management that emerged after the Second World War was
the elimination of doubt’’ (2012, p. 179), and therefore with
the elimination of subjective judgement. This meant that
from the 1950s ‘‘attempts to apply scientific research and
concepts to management and organization increased in
number and sophistication’’ (2012, p. 197). During this
period, ‘leadership’ was largely neglected as a focus of
scholarly attention; indeed there were even calls to aban-
don it as a research topic (see, for example, Greene 1977
and Miner 1975—although this view was not universal, see
Zaleznik 1977).
Throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s, not only
did corporate culture not occupy a central place in man-
agement scholarship and practice, it was even something of
a taboo subject (Peters and Waterman 1982, p. 105).
However, since a ‘cultural turn’ in management thinking in
the early 1980s, this bureaucratic Weberian conception of
management is no longer dominant. During recent decades,
it has become commonplace for the management and
organisational literature to claim that work organisations
ought to be, and increasingly are, post-bureaucratic and
‘flexible’. The Weberian conception of management and
organisations has not disappeared entirely, after all it is
hard to deny that business culture tends to ‘‘suppress dif-
ficult questions of values’’ (Hendry 2004, p. 177), and
some have argued that a process of re-bureaucratisation has
occurred (Hodgson 2004), but where it persists it is often
the subject of considerable dissent:
What is killing us is the illusion of control: that things
can be predictable, consistent and forever under
control. What is also killing us is that followers
require their leaders to be in control, on top of things,
and to take the blame when things go wrong. Nearly
all the new management programmes on TQM, re-
engineering, right-sizing, just-in-time, this or that, are
really old wine in new bottles - more efforts to design
control systems that ask the workers to try harder; do
better and be even more productive. (April et al 2000,
p. 1)
If the conception of the manager-as-bureaucratic-expert
was dominant in the middle of the twentieth century, in the
past few decades, the paradigm has shifted significantly.
MacIntyre once claimed that Marx’s analysis of capitalism
holds true for the period 1848 to 1929 (1970, p. 43), and
although it seems likely that truly neutral, amoral manage-
ment was never a practical reality, it is tempting to
similarly claim that MacIntyre’s account of management
broadly holds true for the period from 1945 to around 1980,
but not beyond.
Since then, it has become common for scholars to
highlight management practices which clearly diverge
from the Weberian paradigm. For instance, Gimpl and
Dakin draw parallels between managers’ and leaders’
forecasting techniques and ancient superstitious fortune-
telling rites used to determine the best hunting grounds and
which gave random answers (1984, pp. 125–137). Such
rites were useful in that they enabled people to resist the
temptation to use the same hunting grounds time and again,
thus preventing over-hunting in those areas. Somewhat
analogously, management forecasting is useful in that it
provides confidence in times of uncertainty, even if the
forecasts themselves are unreliable. These rites are clearly
not explicable in solely Weberian terms, and thus it has
become harder and harder to regard management as a realm
of impersonal technique.
Indeed, according to numerous commentators, including
influential management theorist Henry Mintzberg, in the
latter part of the twentieth century, the concept of ‘lead-
ership’ overtook the concept of ‘management’, and indeed
‘‘pushed it off the map’’ (Mintzberg 2009, p. 1). Arnold
et al note that early management research focused on the
leader-as-tactician whereas more recent studies focus on
the leader-as-inspirational-figure (2005, p. 487). Further-
more, Hollway notes that in recent literature ‘‘the ghost of
managerial leadership has come back to haunt the field’’
and that according to this literature ‘‘managers are not
needed in organizations, only leaders’’ (1991, p. 142).
In what ways does leadership differ from management?
While Mintzberg (2009) has noted that it is, in practice,
impossible to fully separate management and leadership,
there are some important conceptual differences. Kotter
(1990) observes that management is about coping with
complexity and leadership about coping with change;
leaders focus on ‘creating a vision’ whereas managers will
‘develop a plan’. Adair (2009) suggests that leadership is
an art form, whereas management is a science, and that
leadership is associated with personality and vision, man-
agement with structure, routine, and methods. Personal
attributes associated with leadership, such as creativity, are
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the ‘added value’ that leadership brings to management
(Adair 2005, p. 62).
The difference is especially pronounced in the case of
leadership theories which foreground charisma, vision, and
inspiration, such as transformational and charismatic leader-
ship. A comprehensive survey of the leadership literature
would no doubt reveal various other theories and models
which possess some affinities with the theories covered here,
and which may or may not be susceptible to critique as
emotivistic. However, these two accounts of leadership have
dominated the field to the extent that they ‘‘have eclipsed and
possibly maybe stunted’’ other models (Antonakis 2012,
p. 257). Althoughwe can distinguish between charismatic and
transformational leadership (as well as between competing
charismatic and transformational models), they are often
taken as a pair, and indeed as they became dominant were
characterised together as the ‘new leadership’ by Bryman
(1992). For present purposes, we need only note that they are
broadly similar, especially insofar as they focus on affective
responses and aim at persuasion without rational argument.
Leadership in this sense is not an intrinsically scientific
concept, as MacIntyre takes management to be. Good
leaders may require certain abilities, but not the bureau-
cratic expertise of the Weberian manager. The knowledge
and charisma required to be an effective leader are not the
same as the impersonal knowledge of law-like generalisa-
tions once thought to be required for bureaucratic expertise,
and leadership is often expressly concerned with questions
of ethics and values. Quite clearly then, dominant forms of
leadership do not answer to MacIntyre’s description of
amoral technocratic management—the matching of means
to exogenously given ends.
However, this does not mean that modern forms of
leadership are not embodiments of emotivism, nor does it
mean that MacIntyre’s argument does not apply to leaders.
In After Virtue, MacIntyre makes it clear that his argument
pertains to those who ‘‘achieve power or authority’’ (2007,
p. 107) within organisations, and so applies to leaders as
much as managers.
In any case, the charge of emotivism is what concerns us
here, and it seems that the dominant forms of leadership are
more nakedly emotivistic than Weberian forms of
bureaucratic management. Recall the central features of
emotivism: morality is regarded as being non-rational, it
holds that goodness can be grasped by intuition alone,
moral statements are simply statements of preference, and
so causing others to accept one’s preferences is not dis-
tinguishable from persuading them of the rationality of
your view. Moral argument is therefore side-lined in favour
of non-rational forms of persuasion.
While scientific management could justly be regarded as
manipulative in that it saw workers as tools to be expertly
controlled, the dominant forms of leadership are
manipulative in that they attempt to use charisma and
inspiration in place of rational persuasion. Scientific man-
agement inherited some degree of fallibilism from mod-
elling itself on the natural sciences, and so could reject
falsified hypotheses (though in reality management ideas
are often replaced before their adequacy has been deter-
mined—as Ciulla (2000) points out, the life-cycle of
management fads has shrunk from ten years to one year).
By contrast, leadership seems to be even more emotivistic
than the older bureaucratic style of management because it
is less answerable, even in principle, to empirical evidence
and therefore to possible counter-example.
This is clear in Weber’s own work on charisma. For
Weber, charisma in leaders referred to ‘‘specific gifts of the
body and spirit not accessible to everybody’’ (1968, p. 19).
Charismatic authority, unsuited in Weber’s mind to the
tasks of modernity, is quite different from bureaucratic
authority, and at the core of charisma is an emotional
appeal whose ‘‘attitude is revolutionary and trans-values
everything; it makes a sovereign break with all traditional
or rational norms’’ (1968, p. 24). This break with rational
norms is what signals the affinity between modern forms of
leadership and emotivism. Leaders attempt to change
people’s attitudes by provoking an affective response, and
through the ‘aura of feeling which hovers’ around their
words. Thus, the changes effected, unlike changes brought
about through rational argument, will not be the result of
deliberation and debate. As one manager in Kunda’s study
of hi-tech firms put it:
Power plays don’t work. You can’t make ‘em do
anything. They have to want to. So you have to work
through the culture. The idea is to educate people
without knowing it. Have the religion and not know
how they got it. (1992, p. 5)
When displays of power will not suffice, non-rational
manipulation through management of culture is required.
Rational persuasion, note, is not considered as a primary
option. Instead, ever more rhetorically satisfying ways of
saying ‘hurrah for x’ are devised.
This emphasis on the non-rational clearly emerges from
the literature on the dominant forms of leadership. Bono
and Ilies show that ‘‘both leaders’ positive emotional
expressions and follower mood influenced ratings of leader
effectiveness and attraction to the leader’’ (2006, p. 317).
Cherulnik et al (2001) suggest that charisma is contagious,
undermining any requirement for rational persuasion.
Sashkin (1988) notes that leaders rely more on intuition
than intellect. According to Bass, inspirational leadership
‘‘employs or adds nonintellectual, emotional qualities to
the influence process’’ (1985, p. 63). Each of these features
highlights the conceptual connection between the doctrine
of emotivism and contemporary forms of leadership. While
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they clearly do not aim to be neutral and value free, their
focus on achieving their ends through effective means
other than rational persuasion suggests they share some-
thing of the instrumentalism that was characteristic of
bureaucratic management.
Antonakis found that ‘‘Charismatic leaders communi-
cate symbolically, use imagery, and are persuasive in
communicating a vision that promises a better future. In
this way, they create an intense emotional attachment with
their followers’’ (2012, p. 265). Here assent is merely
caused by the alluring rhetoric; it is not brought about
through rational persuasion. The key features of charis-
matic leadership, such as use of metaphor, being a good
story teller, and mastery of rhetoric, all suggest the same
thing: that the dominant forms of leadership are inherently
emotivistic. Even Burns’ (1978) formulation of transfor-
mational leadership, which set itself the noble aim of
encouraging leaders and followers to attain higher levels of
morality, arguably ‘‘collapses into a transactional process
of emotionally charged ideological exchange’’ (Allix 2000,
p. 18). So, it seems that the dominant forms of leadership
which have emerged since MacIntyre published his critique
of management are susceptible to that critique, albeit for
reasons different from those MacIntyre offered. However,
in the following section, we will turn to consider a form of
leadership which is far from dominant, and which might
survive MacIntyre’s charge.
A MacIntyrean Leadership?
MacIntyre himself is sceptical about the possibility of
ethical business and management, and indeed about the
possibility of the good life under capitalism more gener-
ally. Indeed, given his critique of management and the
argument developed here, that it also pertains to leadership,
we might wonder whether MacIntyre’s work has any rel-
evance to a more positive account of leadership. However,
like other business ethicists inspired by MacIntyre’s work
(e.g. Beabout 2012, 2013; Beadle 2013; Dawson and
Bartholomew 2003; Moore 2008, 2012, 2015), we are able
to use MacIntyre’s work against him in this regard.
If the dominant forms of leadership are susceptible to
MacIntyre’s charge of emotivism, what would an account
of leadership compatible with MacIntyre’s moral philoso-
phy look like? There is much in MacIntyre’s work as a
whole which would be essential to a comprehensive
description of MacIntyrean leadership, in particular his
account of practices—rich, complex activities which serve
as the foundation of our moral education (see MacIntyre
2007, p. 187). However, such a comprehensive treatment is
beyond the scope of the present essay; instead, we will
examine the basic shape a MacIntyrean account of lead-
ership must take. Sinnicks (2014) has suggested that
MacIntyre’s political philosophy holds the key to suc-
cessful application of his work in business ethics, and this
section aims to build on this suggestion.
Like Aristotle, MacIntyre defends the anti-elitist claim
that ethics and politics are inseparable. However, MacIn-
tyre argues that contemporary politics is unacceptably
exclusive, and treats the electorate as a passive majority
which is only to be mobilised at periodic intervals. Instead,
we need to foster a rival conception of politics which sets
itself three key aims: to sustain local communities, facili-
tate shared deliberation, and serve the common good
(MacIntyre 1999). While most business ethicists influenced
by MacIntyre have focused on the distinctly ethical part of
his work, it turns out that it is predominantly MacIntyre’s
political philosophy which is most relevant to the question
of ethical management and leadership. The good manager
or leader will, on this view, be principally concerned to
sustain the workplace community, or communities, in
question, to facilitate common deliberation within those
communities, and ultimately to serve the common good
(for an insightful discussion of the challenges involved in
pursuing such goods within organisations, see Moore and
Beadle 2006).
What is most attractive about MacIntyre’s work, both in
its own right and as it pertains to leadership and manage-
ment, is its emphasis on moral education and flourishing.
Community members are perfected by their engagement in
the practice of politics, and its focus on sustaining human
relationships. This political theory is deeply at odds with
our distinctively modern conception of the nation state, but
nevertheless it has consequences for management and
leadership which may be practically applicable without
overturning the existing order.
One of the most striking features of MacIntyre’s polit-
ical philosophy is his claim that ‘‘insofar as human beings
have the capacity to become good, they also have the
capacity to exercise the prudence of a ruler’’ (2006, p. 49).
This implies that those who do in fact become rulers have
no special capacity, a challenge to Weberian managers and
charismatic leaders alike (as well as to the political elites in
modern liberal democracies). Therefore, ‘‘those who arro-
gate to themselves an exclusive, professionalised authority
of a certain kind by that very act of arrogation discredit
their own claims to legitimate authority’’ (2006, p. 51).
This is because such an attitude is liable to prevent the
governed from learning from one another and therefore
from effectively deliberating. In essence, self-professed
elitists underestimate the abilities of ordinary people to
such a degree as to make the claimants incompetent as
governors of those ordinary people. One way in which this
incompetence may manifest itself is by preventing man-
agers and leaders from achieving the balanced perspective
required to make purposeful, moral decisions, which will
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necessarily be at odds with all forms of emotivistic
manipulation.
What this suggests is that leadership and management
must be deeply democratic—to a degree which contem-
porary democratic governments usually are not—and
involve the equal and active participation of all relevant
parties, if it is to deliver on its moral potential. However, in
practice, there are several reasons to think this aim may be
worthy but impossible. Firstly, even if we aspire to the
level of democratic participation MacIntyre advocates,
efficiency may require someone to be answerable for
decisions, which would pose significant challenges for any
attempt to establish management by sortition, the process
of random selection used to appoint officials in Athenian
democracy. Secondly, even if MacIntyre is right, it may
still be the case that not everyone successfully develops his
or her potential for rule, for whatever reason. Thirdly, not
everyone is interested in workplace democracy or aspires
to a position of influence; some regard work merely as a
means to other ends. So, for now we will assume that some
kind of established and formally hierarchical leadership is,
at least in the majority of cases, desirable, and that we
should be concerned with finding the most ethically ame-
liorative account of leadership. Such an account will be
modelled on MacIntyre’s political philosophy even though
it will inevitably fall short of his ideal.
Based on the central tenets of MacIntyre’s account of
politics, the concept of servant leadership, initially
espoused by Greenleaf in the 1970s, is a most promising
candidate for an account of ethical leadership. Beabout has
noted that Greenleaf’s work influenced Block’s account of
stewardship which informs Beabout’s own MacIntyrean
account of management (2013, pp. 175–176). While there
is ‘‘still no consensus about a theoretical framework of
servant leadership’’ (Van Dierendonck 2011, p. 1229) more
generally, it seems that Greenleaf’s concept provides a
useful basis for a broadly MacIntyrean account of leader-
ship, and in turn can be usefully supplemented by MacIn-
tyre’s arguments.
Servant leadership is based on the idea that, as its name
suggests, a leader’s first priority ought to be to serve others.
According to Greenleaf, under servant leaders, employees
can become ‘‘healthier, wiser, more autonomous and more
likely themselves to become servants’’ (1977, p. 6). This
echoes MacIntyre’s claim that in a rational polity, all must
learn to rule and be ruled (2011, pp. 13–14), and adheres to
the general emphasis on serving the common good found
throughout his political writings. This view holds that true
leadership is allocentric in a way that the dominant forms
of leadership could not be, and as such servant leadership is
not open to the charge of emotivistic manipulation levelled
at bureaucratic management and charismatic and transfor-
mational leadership above. Servant leadership does not set
out to cause assent (to ‘X is good’, for instance), and so
does not need to provoke an emotive response through
rhetorical means (‘hurrah for X’).
In the absence of law-like generalisations, the servant
leader must recognise the fallibility of his or her judge-
ments. Servant leadership requires humility, and for lead-
ership to reflect the community in which it is situated (as
Grint (2005, p. 101) suggests for leadership as a whole).
Servant leadership is thus a moral position as much as an
account of organisational practice, and requires leaders to
put the well-being of ‘followers’ before other goals.
According to Sendjaya et al (2008), servant leaders practice
voluntary subordination in attending to the legitimate needs
of others. The intended contrast here is with ‘‘self-seeking
leaders who serve others only when it is convenient or
personally advantageous’’ to do so (Sendjaya et al 2008,
p. 406). The humility implied here is in stark contrast to the
dominant leadership paradigm. According to Tourish and
Pinnington, many mainstream business leaders ‘‘develop a
monomaniacal conviction that there is one right way of
doing things, and believe they possess an almost divine
insight into reality’’ (2002, p. 147), and thus lack the
humility required by servant leadership. Given the
emphasis on serving others, the threat of this egoistic
delusion is clearly reduced for servant leaders. Lee and
Zemke state, ‘‘The [servant]-leader’s belief system says he
or she is no better than those who are led’’ (1993, p. 86), an
explicit rejection of the claim to ‘‘an exclusive, profes-
sionalised authority’’ MacIntyre warns against. This again
highlights the affinities between Greenleaf’s concept of
leadership and MacIntyre’s political philosophy.
Smith et al. (2004) posit that the leader’s motivation is
what distinguishes servant leadership from charismatic
leadership. Motivation is an especially important factor as
it changes the relationship with those being led. Such an
emphasis on motivation is an important characteristic, and
arguably an advantage, of virtue ethics in general, which
again highlights servant leadership’s proximity to MacIn-
tyre’s philosophy. Indeed, one of the main criticisms of
servant leadership is that it describes a philosophy rather
than a measurable leadership style (though see Van
Dierendonck 2011 for a review of the empirical work that
has been carried out).
Greenleaf regarded his approach to have a spiritual
dimension, and servant leadership seems to require a
change in a person’s character (Marshall 2003), suggesting
that servant leadership is indeed a philosophical position as
much as a leadership style. However, when viewed through
the prism of MacIntyre’s moral theory, this apparent
weakness reveals itself to be a strength. On MacIntyre’s
view, while there is a core conception of virtue, and while
there is a set of virtues—justice, courage, and honesty
(2007, p. 191)—that are universal goods and found, to
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greater or lesser degrees, in all human societies, the exer-
cise of the virtues is highly context-dependent. For exam-
ple, courage is the virtue of being willing to risk harm in
pursuit of some good, but members of different cultures
and social groups may give different answers to the ques-
tion ‘what exactly is the mean between cowardice and
rashness?’ Therefore, an account of courage which aims to
stipulate precisely what courage is and is not is liable to be
blind to hitherto unexpected counter-examples and
unforeseen social and cultural conditions. Similarly, an apt
implementation of servant leadership will vary with cir-
cumstances, and with the particular ends and agents being
served. As such, it would be unwise to seek to stipulate the
necessary array of essential features that would make it a
discrete measurable leadership style. Moreover, it is
inherently difficult to measure the virtues (see Robson
2015). In any case, measurable leadership styles seem to
have little advantage even when it comes to achieving set
ends. Alimo-Metcalfe and Alban-Metcalfe, who have also
argued for the superiority of servant leadership over
transformational models (see their 2005), report that stud-
ies which have attempted to find a correlation between
leadership style and outcome (e.g. productivity, stress,
absenteeism) actually found no such correlation (2002,
p. 304).
Another possible response to this charge is that, given
the apparently cyclical pattern of corporate scandal, fol-
lowed by public outcry, followed by a call for greater
emphasis on business ethics, and followed by a return to
normal and then a fresh round of corporate scandal (Abend
2014, p. 19), it is perhaps time for a position that gives
moral philosophy, and the character traits associated with
the ideal of service, priority over other considerations.
Servant leadership may therefore be just the definitive
break with the instrumentalism characteristic of Weberian
management that is needed in light of the recurrence of
breakdowns in business ethics. That is not to say that ser-
vant leadership is to be seen as a panacea for problems like
corruption and cronyism, but that such ethical problems
give us good reason to be less resistant to what may ini-
tially strike us as a counter-intuitive or excessively
demanding account of management or leadership.
There are other challenges which can be levelled at
servant leadership. For instance, the claim that servant
leaders are naı̈ve (Johnson 2001), and as such can be seen
as weak or easily manipulated (Bowie 2000). No approach
is entirely immune to risk, and a servant leader must
develop the intelligence to detect attempts at manipulation
as well as the courage to refuse to submit to them, which
may require taking stands which those led incorrectly
believe go against their interests. However, as servant
leadership is a philosophical and ethical position as much
as a leadership style; it seems well-placed to take on such
distinctly ethical counsel. Bowie and Werhane (2005) raise
the possibility of servant leaders falling prey to servility.
However, ‘service’, in the sense intended, is to be seen as a
mean between servility and domination. While it is true
that the dominant forms of leadership run less risk of
falling into servility than does servant leadership, this is
only at the expense of enhancing the risk of collapsing into
the other extreme.
A related but, according to Bowie and Werhane, more
pressing worry is that the desire to serve produces
workaholics who neglect their personal lives. MacIntyre’s
remarks about patience are instructive here:
Patience is the virtue of waiting attentively without
complaint, but not of waiting thus for anything at all.
To treat patience as a virtue presupposes some ade-
quate answer to the question: waiting for what?
(2007, p. 202)
On such a view, patiently waiting for something that is not
worthwhile would be a mistake. Likewise, patiently
waiting for something that is worthwhile but doing so at
the expense of something more important would also be a
mistake. A similar point can be made about service: a
commitment to serving others is a good, but it ought to be
subordinate to greater goods. So while the ethical core of
servant leadership gives rise to a tendency to sacrifice the
self in order to serve the community of followers, a prudent
leader (i.e. one who also wishes to live to serve another
day) will not do so. Furthermore, a neglect of one’s
personal life seems to be an equal threat to versions of
leadership which give rise to the monomania Tourish and
Pinnington warned of above. There are also, no doubt,
other challenges which may be levelled at servant leader-
ship. However, our discussion about its suitability as a
basis of a MacIntyrean account of leadership has aimed to
show that it has much to recommend it and that it is well-
placed to avoid the charge of emotivism which threatens
the dominant accounts of leadership.
Conclusion
Having outlined MacIntyre’s critique of management, we
saw above that a number of details of that critique are
untenable given the place management occupies in our
culture and the concern with questions of values displayed
by managers. Nevertheless, the central charge of emo-
tivism holds for the dominant transformational and
charismatic forms of leadership, which have emerged in the
decades since After Virtue was first published. Such forms
of leadership possess a number of features of emotivism,
such as the emphasis on affective response and non-ra-
tional persuasion. Despite this emotivism, and despite
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MacIntyre’s general opposition to the institutions of
modernity, there is scope to draw on MacIntyre’s political
philosophy in order to outline an account of leadership, and
Greenleaf’s conception of servant leadership is a promising
place to start due to its compatibility with MacIntyre’s
political philosophy.
It is, of course, possible to support servant leadership
with reference to a variety of other theoretical positions,
such as personalism (Whetstone 2002), and perhaps other
varieties of Aristotelian virtue ethics (as outlined by Foot
2001; Annas 2011 and so on) which are disposed to be
critical of manipulative modes of moral engagement.
Similarly, there may be other forms of leadership, e.g.
engaging, critical, authentic, and so on, which, like servant
leadership, are compatible with attempts to rationally per-
suade followers, and which could be integrated with ser-
vant leadership on account of this affinity with virtue
ethics. However, such a complete map of the terrain is
beyond the scope of the present paper, and may instead be
a fruitful aim for future research.
The appropriate scope of servant leadership is another
topic worthy of further consideration. Like any conception
of leadership, servant leadership is not suited to all situa-
tions. The military commander who, in the heat of the
battle, finds him or herself lost in thought about how to
serve the needs of those led leads badly. Certain contexts
call for an approach based on servant leadership more
obviously than others, and establishing which organisa-
tional contexts are conducive to servant leadership, and
how servant leaders can sustain such contexts in the face of
external pressures, is another possible area for future
research. The various, and at times apparently conflicting,
interests of stakeholders present servant leaders and would-
be servant leaders with serious challenges which require a
good deal of moral insight and sensitivity to adequately
deal with.
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